

This article was retrieved from Education Research Complete database in the CEC Cybrary on 9/8/2015.

Popkewitz, T. S. (2011). Curriculum history, schooling and the history of the present.  
*History of Education, 40(1), 1–19.*

## Curriculum history, schooling and the history of the present

Thomas S. Popkewitz\*

*University of Wisconsin-Madison, Curriculum and Instruction, 225 North Mills Street,  
Madison, 53706 USA*

*(Received 7 August 2009; final version received 6 July 2010)*

The essay focuses on curriculum history as the study of systems of reason. The first section considers curriculum as ‘converting ordinances’, inscribing Puritan notions of education as evangelizing and calculating designs in American Progressive education. The second section examines the Social Question, a cross-Atlantic Protestant reformist movement concerned with the moral disorders of the city that underlie the new sociology and psychologies of schooling. The sciences embodied cosmopolitan cultural theses about modes of life and the urban child who threatened that envisioned future. Hall, Thorndike and Dewey, with different pedagogical implications, embodied these hopes and fears. The final section explores the formation of mathematics, literacy and music education as ‘converting ordinances’ designed in relation to the Social Question. The essay is synoptic and goes against the grain of social and intellectual history through examining the grid of practices in which principles were generated regarding reflection and action.

**Keywords:** curriculum; education sciences; the politics of schooling

History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself. ‘Effective’ history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it does not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.<sup>1</sup>

The field of curriculum history, like the broader education history, is organised by traditions of intellectual and social history; the former is concerned with the organisation and changes in ideas and the latter with institutional and social changes of schools ordered through policy and programmatic developments.<sup>2</sup> The history of curriculum tends to examine, for example, what the schools teach, its organisation of teachers and pupils, the role of students, and how changes in schools contribute to democracy through the structuring of social equality/inequalities. Structures and events are placed

---

\*Email: [tspopkew@wisc.edu](mailto:tspopkew@wisc.edu)

<sup>1</sup>Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971/1977), 138–64.

<sup>2</sup>Barry M. Franklin, ‘Curriculum History and its Revisionist Legacy’, in *Rethinking the History of American Education*, ed. William J. Reese and J. L. Rury (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2008); pp. 223–43.

in chronological sequences whose links and functions relate to one another in an emergence of successions that form the history of schools.<sup>3</sup> With variations and different nuances across nations, historical narratives of schooling express the progressive hopes of democracy and its denials through issues of social control and structural inequities.<sup>4</sup>

This discussion takes a different approach to curriculum as a *history of the present*.<sup>5</sup> History is, as Walter Benjamin<sup>6</sup> suggests, the critical engagement of the present. That engagement, ironically, undertakes to suspend history itself by making visible the conditions that make possible the thoughts and actions of the present. The task of the history of the present in this discussion is to consider the system of reason that orders and classifies what is seen, talked about and acted on in schooling. Reason, as I explore below, is not merely something of the mind to obtain a better representation of reality. The rules and standards of reflection and action are historically generated within social and cultural practices that change over time and space. Curriculum is the site of schooling through which the rules and standards of reason and ‘the reasonable person’ are generated, embodying principles that govern what is to be known and how that knowing is to occur.

The principles that order and classify school curricula are assembled, connected and disconnected through complex historical processes. I speak of the different historical processes as a grid of practice through which the objects of schooling are given intelligibility. The pedagogical subjects of schooling, for example, appear as determinate categories that have their own independent existence and are taken as given in planning school programmes, organizational changes and assessments, such as ensuring the development of the adolescent child, the remediation of the at-risk student and the learning of school subjects. The history of the present is a strategy to excavate the multiple historical practices that come together to give intelligibility to what is ‘seen’ and acted on as the objects of schooling.

The following discussion is synoptic in thinking about the grid of practices through which the curriculum of schooling forms. I focus on American Progressivism and its sciences of education and, at points, their intersection with international studies

---

<sup>3</sup>Thomas S. Popkewitz, ‘The Production of Reason and Power: Curriculum History and Intellectual Traditions’, *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 29, no. 2 (1997): 131–64.

<sup>4</sup>Miriam Jorge Warde, ‘John Dewey Through the Brazilian Anísio Teixeira or Re-enchantment of the World’, in *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 203–30.

<sup>5</sup>Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’; on education see Thomas S. Popkewitz, Barry Franklin and Miguel Pereyra, eds, *Cultural History and Critical Studies of Education: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Schooling* (New York: Routledge, 2001). Thomas S. Popkewitz, *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child* (New York: Routledge, 2008). The category of curriculum studies is largely absent but its conception is embodied in certain European continental scholarship. This notion of curriculum history is related to studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison from the writings of Edward Krug, Herbert Kliebard and Barry Franklin, and more recently, Bernadette Baker. Miguel Pereyra, a historian and comparativist, has over the years continually engaged me in thinking historically about curriculum. I am also indebted to Daniel Tröhler whose comparative scholarship about the language of education strongly contributes to curriculum studies. Finally, this project is indebted to the historical work of David Hamilton and Ivor Goodson.

<sup>6</sup>Walter Benjamin, ed., *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Schocken Books, 1955/1985).

of schooling.<sup>7</sup> The first section considers curriculum as ‘converting ordinances’, drawing on Puritan notions of education as evangelising and calculated designs on the souls of readers. The ‘converting ordinances’ were inscribed in the school curriculum and pedagogy of Progressivism, I argue, as narratives of national belonging and salvation themes of the education sciences related to pedagogy. The second section examines the Social Question, a phrase used by cross-Atlantic Protestant reformers, which gave focus to the planning that was to respond to the economic, social and moral disorder of the city. American Progressive Education and its sociologies and psychologies, I argue, were directed to the Social Question and the fears of the moral dangers and dangerous urban populations to the envisioned cosmopolitan hope of the nation. Progressive pedagogy was disconnected from Puritan notions of ‘converting ordinance’ and (re-)visioned in the amalgamation of different practices. These included the cosmopolitan hope of and fears about the nation and its salvation themes of the future, the challenges embodied in the Social Question, and the theories of the new sciences related to schooling, such as in the community sociology of the Chicago School and the psychologies of Edward L. Thorndike and John Dewey. The final section explores the formation of the turn-of-the-century curricula in mathematics, literacy and music education as a system of ‘reason’ that is formed through a grid of practices discussed previously. School subjects were to change society by making the urban child as the future citizen that ironically inscribed differences and exclusions in the impulse of inclusion.

The essay goes against the grain of curriculum studies. It argues that the history and study of curriculum are not merely the Spenserian question about what is selected, organised and evaluated in schooling. Nor is the question of the political of curriculum about ‘whose knowledge’ is sufficient. The study of the political of schooling and ‘an effective history’, to return to the opening quote, is to introduce discontinuity into our very being through taking what is commonplace and natural in the subjects of schooling in order to uproot their traditional foundations and making fragile what is its seeming causality.

### ‘Converting ordinances’: providential giving and the school curriculum

Schooling, Ó<sup>8</sup> argues, is designed to act on the spirit and the body of children and the young. Examining French and Portuguese pedagogy at the turn of the twentieth century, Ó explores the pedagogical sciences as observing and making visible the inner physical and moral life in order to map the spirituality of the educated subject (‘the human soul’). The new sciences of psychology were central to the design of the child. The French pedagogue Gabriel Compayré in 1885 asserted that pedagogy is an applied psychology and the sources of all the sciences ‘that are related to the moral faculties of man; pedagogy contains all the parts of the soul and must use always

<sup>7</sup>I use curriculum and pedagogy interchangeably in the text to recognise the relation of what is to be known and the modes of knowing that knowledge. See Thomas S. Popkewitz, ‘The Production of Reason and Power: Curriculum History and Intellectual Traditions’, *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 29, no. 2, (1997): 131–64.

<sup>8</sup>J. Ramos do Ó, ‘The Disciplinary Terrains of Soul and Self-Government in the First Map of the Educational Sciences’, in *Beyond Empiricism: On Criteria for Educational Research (Studia Paedagogica 34)*, ed. Paul Smeyers and Mark Depaepe (Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2003), 105–16.

psychology'.<sup>9</sup> The soul was not only of a providential order but concerned European religious concepts of the person (re-)visioned as categories of the human mind. The moral and rational qualities of the human mind, Compayré continues, enable action for intervening and changing the lives of others to ensure individual happiness and collective (social) progress.

The curriculum of the nineteenth-century European school was to systematically develop civic virtue in the actions of the individual. The pedagogy of the school, however, was ordered initially through (re-)visioning the processes of the Church's confessional in early American and European schooling. The confessional was a form of religious schooling by the preacher who provided pastoral care for the religious cultivation of the individual. In the new schooling, the catechism style of instruction of the confessional was transported into the state school as a technology of creating patriotism, morality and republican civic virtue.<sup>10</sup> The style of 'educating' was to provide instruction in concrete obligations of the individual and of the individual to others through the use of reason and science.<sup>11</sup>

The catechism of Martin Luther's Table of Duties, for example, provided a technology of modernisation of Swedish schooling until the 1800s.<sup>12</sup> Heavily influenced by the Scottish enlightenment, Swedish moral philosophers presented the common duties of man [*sic*] and civic virtues as the expression of the doctrines of knowing one's duties to God, the individual and neighbours. Schooling was to provide for moral and civic virtues by producing agents of progress capable of self-guided rational action for the public good. The Table of Duties was founded upon a patriarchal relationship between God and mankind as a father-child relationship, in which the weak and sinful child needed education and guidance. Ecclesiastic and political estates were organised in a hierarchy of superiors to the economic estates of families and servants. The catechism of the Tables instructed how husbands, wives, children and common people would learn obedience and moral virtue toward the patriarchal hierarchy of the estates. The search for perfection also harboured fears about harnessing passions and self-interest that would work against the common good.<sup>13</sup>

American schools had similar purposes but differences in their specific practices for working toward developing moral and civic virtues. Nineteenth-century US pedagogy was related to Puritan notions of education as 'converting ordinances' in forming the greater corporate mission. The curriculum reflected Puritan concerns with teaching as an evangelising and calculated design on the souls of their readers. Drawing on

---

<sup>9</sup>Ó, 'The disciplinary terrains of soul', 106.

<sup>10</sup>The term is drawn from Inés Dussel, 'Republicanism "Out-of-place": Readings on the Circulation of Republicanism in Education in Nineteenth-century Argentina', in *Schooling and the Making of Citizens in the Long Nineteenth Century: Comparative Visions*, ed. Daniel Tröhler, Thomas S. Popkewitz and David Labaree (New York: Routledge, in press).

<sup>11</sup>Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1904–1905/1958).

<sup>12</sup>Daniel Lindmark, 'New Wine into Old Bottles: Luther's Table of Duties as a Vehicle of Changing Civic Virtues in 18th and 19th Century Sweden', in *Schooling and the Making of Citizens in the Long Nineteenth Century: Comparative Visions*, ed. Daniel Tröhler, Thomas S. Popkewitz and David Labaree (New York: Routledge, in press).

<sup>13</sup>Weber, *Protestant Ethic*. Notions of hope and fear are embodied in the Bible. The hope and fears about those who can become ethically purified in the sight of God and those who do not take the sacraments would be ruined by being denied grace. To say this is not to suggest an evolution of thought but a (re)visioning and reassembly of principles associated with the enlightenments' cosmopolitanism discussed later.

John Calvin's notion of *curriculum vitae* or 'a course of life', education was to prepare children for the conversion experience that gave the individual moral behaviour.<sup>14</sup> The Puritans, for example, attached the status and attributes of personhood to an inner soul in which the ethical techniques of individual self-monitoring and control – consciousness and self-consciousness – were developed. Reason, logic and method were learned to find the proper restraint and moral behaviour necessary for self-fulfilment and for the benefit of society as a whole. Community was part of one's *curriculum vitae*. The individual's freedom was indivisible from the shared cultural world that gave unity to all of humankind.

With the founding of the republic in the later eighteenth century, pedagogy as 'converting ordinances' was disconnected from its religious institutional settings to give providential character to the land and its people (or at least certain parts of its population). The religious phrases 'the New World', the citizen as 'the Chosen People', and 'manifest destiny' inscribed in the nation a biblical purpose. The providential character gave the new nation its exceptionalism as the site of escaping the evils, disfigurements and corruption of the Old World Europe.<sup>15</sup>

The new foundation stories of the nation at the beginning of the twentieth century (re-)narrated the nation in salvation and providential themes about the future. The nation was inscribed as the apotheosis of cosmopolitan reason and the triumph of art and science in the liberation of the human spirit realised by the republic.<sup>16</sup>

The promise of the future was, in part, the consequence of the lack of sustainability of the earlier national epic of the early nineteenth century that told of the New World recapturing the pastoral past in its republican life. The crises of unbridled capitalism, the perceived breakdown of moral order in the city, and the brutality of modern warfare coupled with the struggle over slavery of the American Civil War, among others, cast doubt on American exceptionalism as the idyllic reincarnation of a biblical Garden of Eden.<sup>17</sup> The special place of the nation in heralding redemption and salvation for humanity was in the future rather than in recapturing the biblical garden in the incarnation of the nation.

The moral grace of the New World was re-visioned as the millennial potential of the future. The new epic tale of the nation replaced Fredrick Jackson Turner's much heralded frontier thesis concerning the rugged individualism of the American character. The new saga of the uniqueness of the nation was told through its scientific and technological advances.

American exceptionalism was given expression as the technological promise of the future, which Nye called 'the technological sublime', narratives that placed science and the technological in cultural spaces encompassing beauty, aesthetics, awe and fear. The technological marvels of the railroad, electricity, bridges and skyscrapers were placed in a cultural dialogue concerning the national manifest destiny.<sup>18</sup> The

<sup>14</sup>Douglas McKnight, *Schooling, the Puritan Imperative, and the Molding of an American National Identity. Education's 'Errand into the Wilderness'* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003).

<sup>15</sup>Myra Jehlen, *American Incarnation: The Individual, the Nation, and the Continent* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1986); David E. Nye, *American Technological Sublime* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

<sup>16</sup>David E. Nye, *American Technological Sublime*. Nye calls this new foundation of the nation *the technological sublime*.

<sup>17</sup>Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2001).

<sup>18</sup>Nye, *American Technological Sublime*, 5.

natural power of Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, and technologies represented in the railroad, bridge and city skyscrapers were viewed as triumphs of art and science in the emancipation of the human spirit to be realised by the young republic. Foundation stories were told of Americans transforming a wilderness into ‘a prosperous and egalitarian’ cosmopolitan society whose landscape and people had a transcendent presence through their technological achievements.<sup>19</sup> The technologies that made possible the building of the canal and the railroad were narrated as a causal chain of events regarding an inevitable social as well as material progress.

One can begin to think of the emergence of mass schooling and American Progressive Education within this changing context of American exceptionalism and the challenges brought to bear upon these different social and cultural qualities. Progressivism in its broader political as well as educational projects embodied the American enlightenment beliefs in cosmopolitan reason and science in the emancipation of the individual and the progress of society. The earlier nineteenth-century agrarian and pastoral image of society was now (re-)visioned in the urban-ness of the nation and an expanded educational system that substituted for the mobility of the frontier west.<sup>20</sup> The common comprehensive high school at the turn of the century, for example, was initially proposed to be called ‘the cosmopolitan high school’. That notion of cosmopolitanism embodied the faith and optimism of American exceptionalism as the providential character of the nation.<sup>21</sup>

The new social and education sciences that emerged in American Progressivism embodied the foundation narratives of science and technology and its salvation narratives. Stories of American Exceptionalism, for example, were inscribed in the work of Charles Horton Cooley, an early sociologist who wrote on education. Cooley<sup>22</sup> saw the United States as ‘nearer, perhaps, to the spirit of the coming order’ that would be totally different from anything before it. Evoking the narrative of American exceptionalism, Cooley wrote that

... ‘the new industrial modernity’ of America is close to being the first real democracy that is ‘totally different from anything before it because it places a greater emphasis on individuality and innovation’ and ‘does not inherit the class culture of Europe’.<sup>23</sup>

The narratives of the eternal promise of the nation were woven into child development and learning theories. G. Stanley Hall,<sup>24</sup> a major figure in child studies, talked about education in the context of the nation bringing ‘the only complete history [which] is the story of the influences that have advanced or retarded development of man toward his completion, always ideal and forever in the future’. Edward L. Thorndike, a leading educational psychologist, inscribed narratives of national exceptionalism into the

<sup>19</sup>David E. Nye, *America as Second Creation: Technology and Narratives of New Beginnings* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

<sup>20</sup>John Mack Faragher, ‘Introduction: “A Nation Thrown Back Upon Itself”: Frederick Jackson Turner and the Frontier’, in *Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner*, ed. John Mack Faragher (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 1–11.

<sup>21</sup>Edward Krug, *The Shaping of the American High School, 1920–1941*, Vol. 2 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972).

<sup>22</sup>Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1909).

<sup>23</sup>Dorothy Ross, *G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

<sup>24</sup>Granville Stanley Hall, ‘Aspects of Child Life and Education: The Contents of Children’s Mind on Entering School’, *Princeton Review* II (1893/1924): 249–72.



goal of education. Science, he argued, was discovering laws concerning the innate qualities of the individual. The laws would enable a shaping and fashioning individuality that would bring 'the pursuit of happiness'. Educational psychology was to form 'the mind and the spirit of man' so the individual can be responsible for his/her progress, or trustful of his/her future.<sup>25</sup>

The prophetic vision of exceptionalism coupled with a faith in science as a mode of living was embodied in John Dewey's pragmatism. Dewey saw no difference between a universalised notion of Christian values concerning the good works of the individual and the democracy of the nation. Dewey's prophetic vision of democracy linked the ethics of a generalised Christianity (Calvinism) to the progressive revelation of truth. Christianity as the ethical mode of reflection was embodied in democracy as the individual discovers the unfolding and conditional meaning of life.<sup>26</sup> Both Christianity (Calvinist reformism) and democracy were processes through which individuals seek the 'continuously unfolding, never ceasing discovery of the meaning of life'.

The 'Christian Democracy', as Dewey called it in his early writing, emphasises the triumph of reason and science in the calling of democracy.<sup>27</sup> Analogous to Christ's teaching, democracy's spiritual meaning was in its notions of freedom as the continuous search for truth through loosening the bonds of tradition, the wearing away of restrictions of individual growth and development, and the breaking down of barriers and partitions that limit the possibilities of people. This relationship of religion to democracy, Dewey argued, was to think of the latter's political process as a mode of life rather than as a machinery of government.

I assume that democracy is a spiritual fact and not a mere piece of governmental machinery.... If God is, as Christ taught, at the root of life, incarnate in man, then democracy has a spiritual meaning which it behooves us not to pass by. Democracy is freedom. If truth is at the bottom of things, freedom means giving this truth a chance to show itself, a chance to well up from the depths. Democracy, as freedom, means the loosing of bonds, the wearing away of restrictions, the breaking down of barriers, of middle walls, of partitions.<sup>28</sup>

Dewey spoke of the curriculum through the prophetic language of Protestant reformism. Dewey declared that 'Democracy is revelation', using a nineteenth-century belief in English Moderate Calvinism.<sup>29</sup> English Protestant Calvinists replaced rigidity with the coordination of doctrines of reason, natural religion and revelation. Revelation rested on an awareness of God's accommodation or condescension to time, place and particular mentalities in creating the moral good. Democracy as revelation was to promote a mode of living ordered by an open-mindedness. Dewey's 'habits of the

<sup>25</sup>Edward L. Thorndike, 'Darwin's Contribution to Psychology', in *Psychology and the Science of Education. Selected Writings of Edward L. Thorndike*, ed. Geraldine M. Joncich (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1909/1962a), 37–47.

<sup>26</sup>John Dewey, 'Christianity and Democracy', in *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953. The Electronic Edition. The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882–1898* (This database is based on the 37-volume printed edition *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953*, published by Southern Illinois University Press, 1967–1990 [ed. Jo Ann Boydston] from <http://library.nlx.com/titles/index.cfm> ed., Vol. 4: 1893–1894). (Springfield, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1892/1967–1990).

<sup>27</sup>Dewey, 'Christianity and Democracy', 5.

<sup>28</sup>Dewey, 'Christianity and Democracy', 8.

<sup>29</sup>David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment. Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).



mind', notions of problem-solving, experimentation, community and action, central concepts of pragmatism, gave concrete form to what Dewey spoke of as democracy as revelation.

Curriculum served as the 'converting ordinance' to secure the possibilities of the future. Science was a mode of thought to order the school curriculum and its notions of learning that enabled children to think and act as moral beings in the search for truth in an uncertain world. For Dewey, science was the method that would free individuals from the unreflective habits produced through subjection to instinct, appetite and routines.

The educational sociologies and psychologies of Progressivism, while having different epistemological relations as regards the individual and society, overlapped with the cosmopolitan commitment to science as planning for the future and pedagogy as converting ordinances. Science, however, operated in two related qualities in the curriculum. First, science calculated and ordered the social administration of change. That planning for change also entered the curriculum as cultural theses concerning what the child is and how it should live in everyday existence. This second quality of science was embedded in the theories of children's learning, development and growth that generated cultural theses regarding reflection and action in daily life, such as the child whose 'learning' is to design the future through problem-solving. To talk about the child as a problem-solver is not merely a category to help children learn and become better people. The pedagogical distinction of problem-solving embodies a cultural thesis concerning a mode of living; that is, problem-solving instantiates particular principles related to a mode of life and its rules of satisfaction and happiness.

The two notions of science as planning of the social and of life embodied double gestures of hope about the future and fears of threats to that future. The fears were, at one layer, the dangers of the debilitating effects of modern conditions and dangerous kinds of people. In this context, the two trajectories of science as calculating and as a mode of living overlapped as practices to enable progress and protect against the dangers. These double gestures of science were expressed in Dewey's pragmatism:

The existence of scientific method protects us also from a danger that attends the operation of men of unusual power; dangers of slavish imitation partisanship, and such jealous devotion to them and their work as to get in the way of further progress.<sup>30</sup>

The scientific method, Dewey argued, brought into everyday life a means of reflection and action that would protect society from the abuse of power and prevent the evil of the wrong development. The fears of unreflective habits were directed to the qualities of individuality inscribed in a continuum of value that, as I shall discuss later, produce distinctions and divisions concerning characteristics of individuality in the future of the republic.

The cosmopolitanism of the school curriculum and pedagogy embodied different cultural patterns internationally that were not just variations of one set of principles. If I use the worldwide travelling of Dewey's pragmatism at the turn of the twentieth century, pragmatism combined and connected with other theories and cultural practices to shape and fashion notions of the inner moral and rational qualities of the

---

<sup>30</sup>John Dewey, 'The Schools and Social Preparedness', in *Character and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy*, (Vol. II), ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1916/1929), 474–78.

child.<sup>31</sup> Dewey's 'ideas' about agency as intelligent action, for example, travelled to Yugoslavia in the 1920s and 1930s to make Slavic modernity, which viewed the child as embodying divine or natural forces of a 'Slavic Soul'. The soul valorised the rural and the village as the true source of the purpose of action and agency.<sup>32</sup> Brazilian and German reforms placed Dewey as an anti-hero as reformers sought counter-reformation/enlightenment notions of a universal spirituality that linked the nation, school and Church. Dewey was viewed by Brazilian reformers as an *urbanist* (read Protestant reformer) who threatened the spirituality of the nation.<sup>33</sup> German pedagogues who rejected Dewey's Calvinist reformism as morally dangerous were viewed as morally dangerous to Lutheran notions of education as joining the *Geist* or the spirit of the nation and *Bildung*.<sup>34</sup> Dewey's pragmatism connected with the Kemalist project in the formation of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s, and the reforms of the Chinese May 4 Movement in 1911 that redefined its sensibilities and political agendas. It was (re-)visioned as a modernising project coupled with, respectively, the reformist tendencies in turn of the twentieth century Ottoman Islamic and Confucian cultures.<sup>35</sup>

### The social question of progressivism: science and the fears of dangerous populations

While Progressive Education and its sciences of pedagogy are usually considered as distinctive within its national project, it embodied a cross-Atlantic social reform movement related to Northern European and North American Protestant (Calvinist) reformism. Central to the reform movement was the Social Question. The Social Question, what German social theorists called 'Die Soziale Frage' in the nineteenth century, gave focus to the amelioration of the physical, social and moral conditions of the city through planned intervention. The new social sciences in conjunction with civil reforms would identify the causes of alcoholism, delinquency and prostitution, among other practices, that violated the presumed norms of civility. Important to the reform efforts were poor relief, public ownership and development of urban transportation, planning of city streets and zoning, wage labour protection, the development of public and modern housing, and mass schooling directed to urban populations.

<sup>31</sup>Thomas S. Popkewitz, ed. *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education* (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005).

<sup>32</sup>Noah Sobe, 'Balkanizing John Dewey', in *Modernities, Inventing the Modern Self, and Education: The Traveling of Pragmatism and John Dewey*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 135–80.

<sup>33</sup>Miriam Jorge Warde, and Marta Maria Chagas de Carvalho, 'Politics and Culture in the Making of History of Education in Brazil', in *Cultural History and Education. Critical Essays on Knowledge and Schooling*, ed. Thomas P. Popkewitz, Barry Franklin, and Miguel Pereyra (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2001), 83–106.

<sup>34</sup>Daniel Tröhler, 'Langue as Homeland: The Genevan Reception of Pragmatism', in *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 61–85.

<sup>35</sup>Kenaro Ohkura, 'Dewey in the Modern Japan', in *Modernities, Inventing the Modern Self, and Education: The Traveling of Pragmatism and John Dewey*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 279–99; Jie Qi, 'A History of the Present on Chinese Intellectuals: Confucianism and Pragmatism', in *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 255–78; Sabiha Bilgi and Seçkin Özsoy, 'John Dewey's Travelings into the Project of Turkish Modernity', in *Modernities, Inventing the Modern Self, and Education: The Traveling of Pragmatism and John Dewey*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005), 153–80. This is discussed in the various case studies.

The Social Question helps to locate Progressive Education historically as not merely part of the temporal index of the development of schooling but within broader international social and cultural formations. When looking at American Progressive schooling, it embodied the characteristics of the Northern European Protestant reform movements directed to urban reform. Phrased in a democratic rhetoric, the reforms were to produce a like-minded American, an inclusive community, and to produce able, virtuous individuals who gave America its destiny.<sup>36</sup>

The progressive desire for a virtuous society, however, continually inscribed threats to that community. Criticism of the school curriculum brought to the fore questions about learning the skills and dispositions that would enable urban children to become productive citizens. But questions about immigrants and race instantiated fears of those who threatened the presumed social unity. The high failure rate and pressures on children not able enough, one critic of the teaching of algebra argued, produced pressures that injured ‘the mind, destroyed the health, and wrecked the lives of thousands of children’.<sup>37</sup> Others complained about disturbing harmony and consensus through, for example, teaching girls mathematics, which would make a girl ‘lose her soul’ and contribute ‘nothing to their peace, happiness, and contentment in the home’.<sup>38</sup>

The pedagogical reforms and the sciences of education were to plan urban life by changing urban populations. The search for civic virtue and its dangers were embodied in *The Dynamics of Sociology* by Lester Frank Ward, a founding member of the Chicago School of Sociology and colleague of John Dewey. Ward’s sociology embodied a social Darwinism that gave attention to efforts to artificially intervene in the immigrant family and ‘civilise’ ethnic habits and traditions. Ward argued that education needs an ‘absolute universality’ that was ‘to neutralize the *non-civilized* or it will lower all of society’. Methods of socialisation in education were ‘to raise the *uncivilized* classes up toward its level’ and to take ‘the lesser of a civilization’, ‘the savage person whose actions springs from emotions and not the intellect’.<sup>39</sup> Edward Ross, in the first edition of *The Principles of Sociology*,<sup>40</sup> saw the school as the most important instrument to contain the threat of the growing diversity of the American population. Such diversity, he felt, divides cultures, languages and norms. Ross argued that the United States relied on education to undo immigrants’ modes of living and to disseminate the ideas and ideals associated with American Exceptionalism. The social cohesion was to prevent ‘disruptive ideas’ such as those represented in the Bolshevik revolution or the idea of employers as exploiters. The dividing practices were to be counteracted with the pride in and spread of American ideas.<sup>41</sup>

The correcting of the ignorance and moral disorder of the city was placed into psychological registers of pedagogy that ordered the selection and organisation of the school curriculum. Thorndike’s studies of children’s learning, for example, were bound to the Social Question and its concern with urban life. Thorndike’s psychology

---

<sup>36</sup>Barry Franklin, *Building the American Community: The School Curriculum and the Search for Social Control* (New York: Falmer Press, 1986).

<sup>37</sup>Edward Krug, *The Shaping of the American High School, 1880–1920* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964).

<sup>38</sup>Krug, *Shaping of the American High School, 1880–1920*, 347.

<sup>39</sup>Lester Frank Ward, *Dynamic Sociology, or Applied Social Science, as Based Upon Statistical Sociology and the Less Complex Sciences* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1883).

<sup>40</sup>Edward A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York: Century Company, 1920).

<sup>41</sup>Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 410.

incorporated a hereditary view of intelligence that was moral in character.<sup>42</sup> The notion of intelligence and moral character embodied a belief that differentiated Black Americans as less intelligent than white Americans. Education was to ensure that children study those subjects from ‘which they may get health, escape poverty, enjoy their leisure hours, and otherwise have more of what a decent, but not very idealist, person wants’. The good will of men can be created and intensified, Thorndike continued, through identifying ‘the facts and laws’ for the ‘treatment of subject races, in legislation for criminals and dependents, in the care for public health, and in the new view of the family, we may see the influence of Darwinism beginning to spread to statesmanship and social control’.<sup>43</sup> That determination of difference, for Thorndike, was hereditary and related to eugenics.

The inscription of the moral disorder of the city in the Social Question also brought to the fore notions of community in theories and practices related to the family and childhood. This is the tale of two cities: the urbane Protestant reforms in the different Progressivisms looked to nature as a nostalgic image of a past rural community that could be reinscribed in urban reforms of urban immigrant and racial families. The notion of community emerged in the Chicago School of Sociology that drew from and adapted German social theories concerning the fall and resurrection of the city as a centre of culture, belonging and home. The pastoral vision of community where the face-to-face interactions of neighbours prior to modernity come closest to nature was contrasted with that of a society where such trust and moral order was no longer established. Cooley, for example, deployed the concept of community as a regulatory principle to think about the stability and change of society. The sociological theory was to provide ways of creating patterns of small community interactions that would eliminate the alienating qualities of modernity. For Dewey and his Chicago colleague George Herbert Mead, the formation of the individual was derived through processes of mediation and self-realization in the domains of community. Mead’s social interactionism re-visioned the imagined *pastoral image* with an urban idea of community ‘without doing violence to liberal democratic values’.<sup>44</sup> Dewey’s notions of ‘intelligent action’, problem-solving and community provide a way to *urbanise* notions of the pastoral, rural face-to-face community into a mode of life in industrial conditions.

The new sciences of pedagogy through which the curriculum was shaped and fashioned embodied inscriptions that linked notions of community and learning as practices to govern individual lives, and to carry out responsibilities that are not only for self-development and growth but also for standardised public virtues. The invention of a range of technologies inscribed the norms of public duty in the child while not destroying its private authority. Rose refers to these as technologies of ‘*responsibilization*’ where the schools, like the family, ‘link public objectives for good health and good order of the social body with the desire of individuals for personal health and well-being’.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>Franklin, *Building the American Community*.

<sup>43</sup>Edward L. Thorndike, ‘The Psychology of Arithmetic’, in *Psychology and the Science of Education. Selected Writings of Edward L. Thorndike*, ed. Geraldine M. Joncich (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1909/1962), 83–90.

<sup>44</sup>Franklin, *Building the American Community*, 8.

<sup>45</sup>Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 74.

The government of freedom, here, may be analyzed in terms of the deployment of technologies of *responsibilization*. The home was to be transformed into a purified, cleansed, moralized, domestic space. It was to undertake the moral training of its children. It was to domesticate and familiarize the dangerous passions of adults, tearing them away from public vice, the gin palace and the gambling hall, imposing a duty of responsibility to each other, to home, and to children, and a wish to better their own condition. The family, from then on, has a key role in strategies for the government of freedom. It links public objectives for good health and good order of the social body with the desire of individuals for personal health and well-being. A ‘private’ ethic of good health and morality can thus be articulated on to a public ethic of social order and public hygiene, yet without destroying the autonomy of the family – indeed by promising to enhance it.

The significance of the science of pedagogy, as should be evident from the above, was not merely finding the progressive path to the future. The sciences embodied a comparative style of thought that produced distinctions and differentiations that excluded in its impulse for inclusion. There was a growing optimism regarding the ‘eternal promise’ of childhood in which, for example, the pragmatism of Dewey and the scientific pedagogy of Hall and Thorndike competed.<sup>46</sup> That optimism was not only about the child as the future citizen in the Promised Land. The hope, some historians have said, was of the translation of the Reformation’s ultimate question of ‘How can I be saved?’ into the American enlightenment pragmatic question of ‘How can I be happy?’.<sup>47</sup> Pleasure was no longer seen as a distraction in the pursuit of virtue but as virtue itself.

This movement to the pursuit of happiness in the field of American curriculum was expressed in the science of Edward L. Thorndike that I have discussed earlier. Thorndike’s connectionist psychology was a response to the Social Question. It brought to the fore the redemptive hope of American Exceptionalism and fears of the dangers and dangerous populations that threatened its promised future. The science of psychology, for Thorndike, was to reduce or eliminate the conditions that prevented the individual’s pursuit of happiness. Connectionism psychology was a practice of social intervention that differentiated the happy and unhappy populations. Thorndike accepted Bentham’s notion of seeking the greatest pleasure for the greatest numbers.<sup>48</sup> Educational psychology was to prepare children for ‘the serious business of life as well as for the refined enjoyment of its leisure’.<sup>49</sup> The science of psychology was to identify the nature of the individual, which pedagogy could develop to bring greater happiness. Thorndike sought correlations between those actions that give pleasure and those that promote survival. The Spencerian question of ‘What Knowledge is of Most Worth?’<sup>50</sup> was transferred into the criterion of *happiness* identified through calculating individual wants: ‘We judge the relative value of different sorts of knowledge by

<sup>46</sup>Jennifer Monaghan, and Wendy Saul, ‘The Reader, the Scribe, the Thinker: A Critical Look at Reading and Writing Instruction’, in *The Formation of the School Subjects: The Struggle for Creating an American Institution*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: Falmer Press, 1987), 85–122.

<sup>47</sup>Darrin McMahon, *Happiness: A History* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).

<sup>48</sup>Geraldine M. Joncich, *The Sane Positivist: A Biography of Edward L. Thorndike* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).

<sup>49</sup>Edward L. Thorndike, and R.S. Woodworth, ‘Education as Science’, in *Psychology and the Science of Education: Selected Writings of Edward L. Thorndike*, ed. Geraldine M. Joncich (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1901/1962), 48–69.

<sup>50</sup>Thorndike, ‘Darwin’s Contribution to Psychology’, 145.



the extent to which each helps toward the ultimate end of education – the improvement and satisfaction of wants.’ The idea of worth is ‘worth more to most people’.<sup>51</sup>

The psychology of Thorndike, like the other icons of curriculum and school history discussed earlier, assembled the more general cultural premise about producing the self-motivated and self-responsible individual who participated in processes believed necessary for the working of the republic. Here, we can think of Thorndike’s learning theory as the means to effect wants that were believed to further the cosmopolitan goals of freedom. The utilitarian purpose of learning was to pursue most efficiently the ability to reason and act with freedom by developing what was natural to the individual.

Effecting individual happiness is to reach into the soul. The modern soul, for Thorndike, was given efficiency by educational sciences that shape and fashion ‘the mind and the spirit of man [*sic*]’ so that as individuals they could be responsible for their progress or entrusted with their future. He argued, for example, that ‘what differentiates man is man’s original nature to reason’.<sup>52</sup> The role of education is to move the individual from mere instinctual habits ‘to more complex, capacity, predispositions that grow into thought, speech, music’ that embody ‘the capacity for reasoning’, so as to satisfy one’s wants. But these wants are not merely natural to the child but are what the sciences of schooling would produce ‘to enable social progress ... and that role of education’ is both the production and the prevention of change.

The art of human life is to change the world for the better – to make things, animals, plants, men, and oneself more serviceable for life’s ends.... Man tries to change their original natures into forms which serve his needs.... Education is grouped with government, hygiene, medicine, business administration, and the like, as one of the arts busied with the production and prevention of changes in human beings.<sup>53</sup>

Thorndike’s aims of education had two simultaneous poles of finding happiness and, at the same time, decreasing human discomfort.<sup>54</sup> The decreasing of human discomfort embodied fears of those qualities and capabilities that threatened the future of the republic. For Thorndike, the efficient practices to satisfy wants establish the ‘urge for children [to study] those subjects by ... which they may get health, escape poverty, enjoy their leisure hours, and otherwise have more of what a decent, but not very idealist, person wants’.<sup>55</sup>

In what today might be seem to be the construction of the subject that made possible the welfare state, producing more precise and accurate knowledge of individual behaviours was to improve the nation’s human resources by enabling the fittest to profit the most from schooling. Thorndike’s references to the range of abilities among children and to equal practice opportunities gave scientific sanction to the liberal theories regarding individual freedom and self-actualisation through the teacher’s discovery of ‘where the child stands and lead him [*sic*] from there’.<sup>56</sup> At the same time, it embodied fears of the dangers posed in immigration questions that evoked divisions between the urban immigrants and Catholics and the rural pastoral images of the

---

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 144.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 46–47.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 70.

<sup>54</sup>Thorndike, ‘The Psychology of Arithmetic’, 47.

<sup>55</sup>Thorndike, ‘Darwin’s Contribution to Psychology’, 142–43.

<sup>56</sup>Joncich, *Sane Positivist*, 21.



reform, urbane Protestantism. The disinterest of science in psychology embodied both the sublime and ‘interests’ through its system of reason that formed the objects of reflection and action.

The fear of those not schooled to embrace the cosmopolitan mode of life was embodied in the narratives of sociology as well as psychology. Edward Ross, one of the founders of American sociology, took the notion of social control to argue for inscribing habits that would bring moral order. In *Principles of Sociology*<sup>57</sup> Ross, responding to the Social Question, suggested that there were various instruments of social control to contain the threat of the growing diversity of the population but that none was as important as the school. The nationalising of different peoples with different cultures, languages and norms required schooling to unite the whole by disseminating the ideas and ideals of American exceptionalism: ‘The Tsars relied on the blue-domed Orthodox Church in every peasant village to Russify their heterogeneous subjects, while we Americans rely for unity on the “little red school house”’. The individual was to learn to be productive within his or her assigned role as a future citizen.

Ross’s conception of securing individual happiness in society was different from that of Dewey or Lester Frank Ward. The problem of the social sciences, Ward argued, was to artificially modify social conditions to provide for civilising processes. Ward, for example, recommended moving the immigrant family of the settlement house away from the habits of the savage and the barbarian. The inscription of reason was to stand as a universal principle that made visible the civilised child who ‘can act as desired’ with liberty. Methods in socialisation in education were to take ‘the lesser of a civilization’, ‘the savage and ... stagnant people’ and ‘to raise the *uncivilized* [emphasis in the original] classes up toward its level’.<sup>58</sup>

For Dewey, the learning of science as ‘habits of the mind’ was to create conditions for the mode of life considered necessary for the democratic process. That mode of life simultaneously constituted the inscription of the American enlightenment hopes that connected with the technological sublime which places science and technology as the apotheosis of reason, and a response to the Social Question concerning how to create a new moral order. Science was to enable children to think and act ‘democratically’ in a world of uncertainty. That was its hope. Fears, as I cited earlier, were to protect against the debilitating effects of modern conditions.

Those fears were not only of the conditions of modernity. They were of the qualities of people dangerous to the future of the republic. The systematic training in ‘thinking’ was to prevent ‘evil of the wrong kind of development [that] is even greater [as] ... the power of thought ... frees us from servile subjection to instinct, appetite, and routines’.<sup>59</sup>

The double gestures of hope and fear were not produced by conscious intent. Just the opposite. What was at stake was the rules and standards of reason that ordered the different strands of Progressive Education given expression by, for example, Ward, Ross, Dewey and Thorndike. The standards and rules that were assembled and that ordered the reason of pedagogy inscribed distinctions, differentiations and divisions in a continuum of values. Schooling and its sciences of curriculum design instantiated a comparative style of thought that differentiated and divided.

---

<sup>57</sup>Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 409.

<sup>58</sup>Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, 159–60.

<sup>59</sup>Dewey, ‘Schools and Social Preparedness’, 478.

### School subjects and Making Society by Making the Child

At this point I explore school subjects as made possible within the grid of historical practices discussed previously. School subjects are ‘seen’ and acted on as determinate categories. Instruction assumed that teaching is about its object, such as learning physics and mathematics. Reforms are to create more effective and efficient ‘delivery’ of learning. This is clear, I believe, in contemporary US and European teacher education reform efforts. Reforms call for teachers with greater subject content knowledge and pedagogical knowledge. The principles of teaching school subjects in the reform, I argue historically, elide the overlapping practices that govern its ‘reason’. School subjects were not invented to teach music or science per se, but were assembled as converting ordinances in relation to modes of life. Pedagogy linked collective narratives with principles generated about who the child is, who it should be, and who does not ‘fit’ the envisioned future.

The idea of school subjects was, in one sense, an invention of the nineteenth century. The early decades of the seventeenth-century school curriculum were linked to the names of the books read. For example, high school students were to read two books of Caesar and three of Virgil for the study of Latin. Colleges prescribed what books students should read in English for their admission and for the examinations that were given for entrance up to at least 1885. By the first decades of the twentieth century, school subjects formed around particular disciplinary knowledge with the new science of psychology providing its pedagogical principles.

The changes in the principles organising school subjects can be considered as analogous to the alchemy of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century alchemists and occult practitioners who sought to turn base metals into pure gold. Like alchemy, pedagogy is a practice that magically transforms sciences, social science and humanities into school subjects.<sup>60</sup> Processes of translation are necessary as children are not social scientists or concert musicians. What is at issue is the particular technologies of pedagogy that translate and order school subjects.

When examined, the particular rules and standards for teaching the school subjects of mathematics, literacy, music and social studies education had more to do with the converting ordinances of pedagogy rather than with pedagogies related to learning disciplinary practices. The selection and organisation of school subjects was, at one level, to bestow moral grace on the nation and the promise of progress. Although possibly seeming far-fetched today, school textbooks in the nineteenth century taught geometry and chemistry as bringing progress to the lands of the West through their use in mining and smelting.<sup>61</sup> Edward L. Youman, a founder of *Popular Science Monthly*, wrote of how the teaching of chemistry involves ‘the processes of human industry, connects its operation with our daily experience, involves the conditions of life and death, and throws light upon the sublime plan by which the Creator manages the world’. Geology taught the truths of Genesis, and zoology provided learning of classifications that placed man at the top of nature’s hierarchy. ‘Understanding scientific laws drew people closer to God, partly by enhancing productivity’, and by teaching students that life and death were shaped by a chemical process that was part of ‘an endless cycle of dust to dust’.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup>Thomas S. Popkewitz, *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

<sup>61</sup>William Reese, *The Origins of the American High School* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

<sup>62</sup>Reese, *Origins of the American High School*, 108, 109, 111.

With the turn of the twentieth century, secular themes of salvation were embodied in school subjects. The curriculum of science, mathematics, literature and history were to improve ‘mankind’ and develop a world community centred on the narratives of the nation and salvation themes of Protestant reformism.<sup>63</sup> These narratives, however, need to be historically considered within the technological sublime discussed earlier. The curriculum of school subjects gave focus to science and technology in a cultural dialogue concerning the triumphs of art and science as the apotheosis of cosmopolitan reason and science in the making of the nation. Mathematics education, for example, was seen as a practical subject that students needed for understanding everyday activities as well as being necessary in ‘the practical needs in building homes, roads, and commerce’.<sup>64</sup> Thorndike’s studies of arithmetic were to enable democracy to work through enabling people to pursue their happiness which related to their innate (and differential) natural ability.<sup>65</sup>

The learning of the concepts of arithmetic was to order life by making scientific ‘reasoning’ and the logic of mathematical relations the method through which the child’ gives relevance to the events of the world and individual action.<sup>66</sup>

The teaching of school subjects was also a response to the urban reformism embodied in the Social Question. The new curriculum opened up to the ‘inarticulate and illiterate’ of the working classes and immigrants. Thomas Jesse Jones, associated with the settlement house movement and chair of the 1916 report *The Social Studies in Secondary Education*, spoke optimistically of the ‘Negro and Indian races’ as not being able to develop properly, but stated that they would now be able to do so through the creation of the new school subject of social studies.<sup>67</sup> English as a subject in the English school was related to the governmental provisions for social welfare.<sup>68</sup> The narrative structures and ethical messages of literary texts were to help the reader become the moral agent who embodied cosmopolitan values and notions of ‘civility’. The rules of moral conduct were accomplished by making the stories of literature relevant to the everyday experiences of working-class children. Relevance meant showing students how the rules and standards for moral conduct could be practised in daily life.

Seemingly with different public priorities from science and social studies, the inception of school music in Boston during the 1830s linked the tradition of singing in Prussian schools to the governance of the child as future citizen.<sup>69</sup> Horace Mann, Secretary of the newly created Massachusetts Board of Education, wrote in his 1844 ‘Report to the Boston School Committee’ that the harmony of song in vocal instruction provided the child with the model for the child’s own self-regulation in society. Mann discussed music education in relation to the risks that epidemic disease posed to civil society. Vocal instruction was to provide regimens to stimulate the body’s circulation, which would serve to prevent poor moral as well as physical health among the urban

---

<sup>63</sup>Krug, *Shaping of the American High School*, 342.

<sup>64</sup>Reese, *Origins of the American High School*, 111.

<sup>65</sup>Thorndike, ‘The Psychology of Arithmetic’, 133.

<sup>66</sup>Edward L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, Vol. II: *The Psychology of Learning* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1923).

<sup>67</sup>Krug, *Shaping of the American High School*, 343.

<sup>68</sup>Ian Hunter, *Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism*. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994).

<sup>69</sup>Ruth Gustafson, *Race and Curriculum: Music in Childhood Education* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).

populations. Teaching the proper songs would remove the emotionalism of tavern and revival meetings and provide a way to regulate the moral conditions of urban life with a ‘higher’ calling related to the nation.

Music appreciation joined vocal instruction by the beginning of the twentieth century. The curriculum was to eliminate juvenile delinquency, among other evils of society. Its prescriptions for comportment entailed the avoidance of degenerate characteristics associated with racial and immigrant populations. Physiological psychology regarding the proper amount of stimulation for the brain and body was coupled with notions of musical aesthetics, religious beliefs and civic virtue. Singing, for example, was to give expression to the home life of industriousness and patriotism that was set against racial stereotypes of Blacks and immigrants. Minstrelsy, a satiric version of Black music and spirituals, was contrasted with the complexity of music of European ‘civilisation’. A medical expert in the 1920s, employed by the Philadelphia High School for Girls, described jazz (by this time a rubric that included ragtime) as causing disease in young girls and in society as a whole. Psychology was deployed to create a scale of value that compared immature or primitive human development with that of a fully endowed capacity that corresponded to race and nationality. The ‘attentive listener’ was one who embodied the cosmopolitan mode of the civilised life. In teaching manuals, the child who did not learn to listen to the music in a particular way was ‘distracted’, a determinate category bound to moral and social distinctions regarding the child as a drifter, a name caller, a gang joiner, a juvenile offender, a joke maker, or a potential religious fanatic, with acute emotional stress and an intense interest in sex.

### History of schooling and the study of curriculum

The study of curriculum as the history of the present is to critically inquire into the foundations of the present.<sup>70</sup> The historicising of the subjects of schooling is, as the feminist philosopher Butler<sup>71</sup> argues, to challenge what is uncritically taken as natural in regulating and producing subjects. Words like ‘learning’, ‘empowerment’, ‘problem-solving’, ‘self-realisation’, ‘community’, and so on, are not merely there in order that educators should ‘grasp’ some reality to act upon. Nor are the discourses of schooling merely an epiphenomenon of ‘the real’. The nineteenth-century distinctions between realism and nominalism – text and context – elide more than they make apparent. The rules and standards of reason are ‘material’ – the effects of power and the political of schooling.

This discussion of curriculum as ‘the history of the present’ focused on different social and cultural practices that came together at the turn of the twentieth century to make intelligible various strands of American progressivism. The notion of ‘grid’ was a methodological strategy to explore different historical trajectories that travelled and came together in the nineteenth century to generate principles about what is seen, thought and acted on in schooling.

As part of that grid that gave intelligibility to Progressive Education, I explored the psychologies of Hall, Dewey and Thorndike and the Chicago sociologies of community and urban life. While embodying different assumptions about the child and

<sup>70</sup>Popkewitz, ‘The Production of Reason and Power’.

<sup>71</sup>Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discourse Limits of ‘Sex’* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

schooling, the sciences were assembled, connected and disconnected with, for example, Puritan notions of pedagogy as ‘converting ordinances’, and cultural narratives regarding science and technology (the technological sublime) in American exceptionalism. I further explored the double gestures of the enlightenment cosmopolitan hopes and fears of the urban moral disorder given attention by the Social Question, a cross-Atlantic Protestant (Calvinist) reform movement. The different historical practices, I argued further, inscribed a comparative style of thought that was given expression in the formation of the school subjects of music, science and literacy.

While the main focus was on the US Progressive Education reforms, the ‘reason’ of curriculum as converting ordinances was not merely a national phenomenon but circulated globally in and out of the West with different sets of principles governing who the child is, who it should be, and who does not ‘fit’ into the given spaces.<sup>72</sup>

Why call this approach a history of the present? It is to understand the conditions in which the objects of schooling are made possible for thought and action. This historicising of the past, however, is not to suggest the repeating and replicating of the past; it is not, however, a presentism. It is a method for understanding change through exploring how the objects of thought and action are assembled, connected and disconnected over time/space. If I take the Social Question concerning the moral disorder of the city, its double gestures of hope and fear are evident in contemporary reforms relating to urban education in the United States. Today’s ‘reason’ concerning the Knowledge Society, lifelong learners, immigrants and the disadvantaged, however, embodies different principles regarding the school subject, subjectivities, and social exclusion and rejection from those generated in the progressive movements.<sup>73</sup> Historicising the systems of reason makes possible the locating of continuities and discontinuities in the rules and standards that order what is seen, talked about, felt and acted on, thus providing ways that can differentiate change from mere motion and activity.<sup>74</sup> The historical trajectories of today are not the sum of the parts, formed through a singular origin, or emerging from an evolutionary progression.

Finally, the political of schooling is in *reason* as historically generated principles about who ‘we’ are and should be. This focus on the political should not be confused with what is taken as the politics of schooling. The latter in the history of schooling takes its subjects as having given identities and gives attention to how groups are represented and the resources allocated to various agents, such as who benefits or is disadvantaged in social mobility, access, achievement and equity in reform programmes. While these questions of politics are important, they leave unexamined the historical practices that order the rules and standards of reason that differentiate, distinguish and divide the subjects of schooling, the theories concerning the child and

<sup>72</sup>For different cultural, social and political assumptions internationally – inside and outside the West – in the ‘reason’ of schooling see, e.g., Popkewitz, 2005; and Daniel Tröhler, Thomas S. Popkewitz and David Labaree, eds (in press), *Schooling and the Making of Citizens in the Long Nineteenth Century: Comparative Visions* (New York: Routledge); Kentaro Kentano Ohkura and Masako Shibata, ‘Demystifying the Divine State and Rewriting Cultural Identity in the U.S. occupation of Japan’; Noah Sobe, ed., *American Post-conflict Educational Reform: From the Spanish-American War to Iraq* (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2009), 129–46.

<sup>73</sup>See, e.g., discussion of the notions of the lifelong learner, the Knowledge Society, and community in contemporary reforms in Popkewitz, 2008.

<sup>74</sup>This distinction between a theory of change and studies that elide change through its concerns with motion and activity is discussed in Thomas Popkewitz, *Paradigm and Ideology in Educational Research* (New York: Falmer Press, 1984).

childhood, and the psychological ‘tools’ for administering the curriculum. Rabinow suggests, for example, that systems of reason cannot be taken for granted. Knowledge, he argues, is simultaneously political, ethical, and aesthetic:

[Knowledge] is conceptual because without concepts one would not know what to think about or where to look in the world. It is political because reflection is made possible by the social conditions that enable this practice (though it may be singular, it is not individual). It is ethical because the questions of why and how to think are questions of what is good in life. Finally, all action is stylized, hence it is aesthetic, insofar as it is shaped and presented to others.<sup>75</sup>

### Notes on contributor

Thomas S. Popkewitz is Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. His studies are concerned with the systems of reason that govern pedagogical reforms, research traditions, and teacher education. His recent publications include *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of Reform: Science, Education and Making Society by Making the Child* (2008); *Schooling and the Making of Citizens in the Long Nineteenth Century: Comparative Visions* (2011) edited with Daniel Tröhler and David F. Labaree; and *Globalization and the Study of Education* (2009) edited with F. Rizvi, which focuses on critical analyses of the changing conditions influencing schooling. He is currently working on a book about social science as a history of the present, examining the historical and political limits of social science as planning who people are and should be.

---

<sup>75</sup>Paul Rabinow, *Antropos Today: Reflections on Modern Equipment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).



Copyright of History of Education is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.